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A Strategic Rationale for
Captive Supplies
H. Alan Love and Diana M. Burton
Partial backward integration is prevalent in many agricultural and natural resource
processing  industries.  A  strategic  rationale  for  partial  backward  integration  is
developed for a dominant firm with a competitive fringe purchasing from competitive
input suppliers.  A partially  backward  integrated  dominant  firm potentially  can
increase  profit through production  efficiency gains  and through a lower price for
externally purchased  input.  The optimal  degree  of backward integration  results
when the  dominant  firm's  profit  from  exerting  monopsony market power  in the
external spot market equals its profit from producing raw input internally, less the
incremental  cost of acquiring internal raw input production capacity. Comparative
statics  results  are consistent  with  recent empirical  studies  of the  beef packing
industry.
Key words:  backward integration, captive supplies, dominant firm, fringe firms, meat
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Introduction
Academic and legal debate over the costs and benefits of vertical integration is both well
known and lengthy. On one side, economists see firms' decisions to vertically integrate
as a means of reducing transactions costs,  assuring supply, reducing price risk, or of
alleviating  efficiency  losses  resulting  from  resource  underutilization  (McGee  and
Bassett; Williamson 1975, 1985,  1989; Wu; Azzam  1996). On the other side, economists
see vertical integration  as a means for firms to reduce competition or extract market
rents (Scherer; Perry 1978a, 1989). To date, most discussion has focused on the effects
of a monopolist integrating forward into a competitive downstream intermediate product
market.  Little work exists on the reverse case of a monopsonist integrating backward
into a competitive input market (Perry 1978b;  McGee and Bassett; Hart and Tirole).
However,  backward  integration  is of growing importance  in many agricultural  and
natural resource industries, including poultry processing (Knoeber and Thurman), meat
packing  (Azzam  1996;  Kliebenstein  and  Lawrence),  and  forest  product  industries
(Murray).
Backward  integration occurs through acquiring input suppliers,  establishing long-
term contracts  with existing suppliers,  or investing in new input production  capacity
through internal corporate growth. In some industries, there is increasing concern about
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the effects  of such integration on remaining unintegrated input suppliers. Recently,
cattle producers-through the Western Organization of Resource Councils, a federation
of citizen groups composed of farmers, ranchers, and small businessmen-petitioned the
Secretary of Agriculture to restrict packers' procurement practices.  Specifically, they
argued:
Packers' direct ownership and feeding of cattle for slaughter and their procurement
of slaughter supplies through forward contracts have decreased prices paid to cattle
producers. In addition, because forward contracts are not traded publicly and packer
fed cattle are not sold publicly, these practices unjustly discriminate against some
producers and provide unreasonable preferences to others (Federal  Register, 14 Jan-
uary 1997, p.  1846).
While  several  recent  studies  have  found  support  for the proposition that packer
concentration  may be  allowing firms to exert limited market power in the fed cattle
markets  (e.g.,  Azzam  1992;  Azzam  and Pagoulatos;  Koontz  and  Garcia;  Schroeter;
Schroeter and Azzam; Schroeder et al.), other studies do not reject competitive behavior
(e.g., Muth and Wohlgenant; Stiegert, Azzam, and Brorsen). Packer concentration, in
itself, does not imply that fed cattle  prices are always lower as a result of increasing
concentration  (Azzam and  Schroeter).  After  an  extensive  review  of this  literature,
Azzam and Anderson found that, while market power is limited, "the evidential balance
from time series studies using national data appears to weigh in favor of the hypothesis
that meat packer conduct in live cattle markets is not competitive" (p. 110). Sexton and
Lavoie similarly found that, with a few exceptions, studies generally tend to show "some
statistical evidence of market power, although the measured departures from compe-
tition have mostly been small" (p. 50).
The effects of increasing packer concentration in the red meat packing industry were
recently  investigated  through  a  congressionally  mandated  U.S.  Department  of
Agriculture  (USDA) Packers  and Stockyards  Administration  (PSA) study.  The  PSA
study reports that, during the April 5, 1992 to April 3, 1993 interval, the 43 largest steer
and heifer slaughter  plants procured  82% of fed cattle through the spot market, 8%
through marketing agreements where a packer agrees to purchase a specific number of
cattle per time period, 7% through forward contracts, and 3%  through custom feedlot
arrangements or through wholly owned feedlot operations (p. 170). The study also found
large  firms  are more likely to  use marketing  agreements  and  forward contracts  to
purchase cattle than are other firms. For example, Williams  et al. report, "ConAgra,
Excel,  and IBP account for 73 percent of spot market transactions, but 88 percent  of
marketing agreements and 95 percent of forward contract transactions" (p. 16).
In the cattle industry, captive supplies include cattle that are packer-owned  or fed
and cattle procured  through forward contracts  or  long-term marketing  agreements
(Ward). This definition is aligned with industrial organization tradition that defines an
upstream or downstream firm as vertically integrated if it  controls either directly or
indirectly  the decisions made within the vertical structure (Tirole, p. 170).  Hence, in
1992-93, about 18%  of fed cattle purchased by packers were procured through captive
supply arrangements,  with three large firms accounting for the vast majority of these
transactions. There is also evidence in the beef packing industry that the quantity of fed
cattle purchased through captive supply arrangements has remained nearly constant
during the last decade (USDA, table 16).
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Many natural resource  markets  exhibit characteristics  similar to the beef packing
industry. Typically, processing mills are spatially distributed with high transportation
costs associated with moving raw products to mills, limiting competition among natural
resource buyers. In the forest industry, large processing firms own or lease vast tracts
of timberland,  but also purchase  timber from outside  suppliers.  In 1991,  U.S. forest
product firms  internally  supplied 33%  of total volume  harvested  and  about 38%  of
softwood harvested (Powell et al.). In 1994,  31  forest products  firms in the U.S. and
Canada owned 45 million acres of industrial timberlands and controlled another  162
million acres through lease arrangements with nonindustrial landowners who own no
processing facilities (Mies et al.). These holdings represent roughly 34% of total U.S.
and Canadian commercial-grade timberlands.  The remaining two-thirds of productive
timberlands  are  owned  and  controlled  either  by  nonindustrial  landowners  or  by
governments. Farmers, the largest identifiable group of nonindustrial landowners, own
90% of nonindustrial land in tracts of less than 100 acres.
Clearly, firms use various mechanisms to achieve backward integration into input
markets. There is ample evidence, at least in the beef packing industry, that large firms,
more  than small firms, use these mechanisms  to  achieve at least partial  backward
integration.  In this investigation, we develop an economic rationale for this behavior.
While in reality firms may use vertical integration for a number of reasons,  we follow
Perry (1978a) and focus on firms' strategic use of vertical integration to achieve higher
profits. We demonstrate both graphically and analytically some important implications
of backward integration that may be achieved through controlling a portion of the raw-
input production sector either through long-term contracts or acquisition of upstream
firms. Contrary to the competitive notion that vertical integration is a purely "internal
affair" that does not affect third parties, we find that backward-integrated  processors
can potentially benefit  from at least  two  sources  of increased  profitability.  First,  a
backward-integrated  dominant  firm benefits  from  production  efficiency  gains  (e.g.,
Azzam 1996).  Second, a backward-integrated  dominant firm may benefit from a lower
acquisition  price  for  externally  supplied  raw  inputs.  We  also  show  a  number  of
important comparative statics results relating to backward integration and how they
reflect findings of the recent PSA study.
The analysis that follows extends Perry's (1978b) work on backward integration in
several directions. First, our model extends Perry's analysis from the monopsony case
to a backward-integrated  dominant firm with a competitive fringe of input purchasers.
Second, we add structure consistent with agricultural and natural resource processing
industries  to  the  assumed  technology  that results in  a  more  detailed  and  clearer
exposition of the potential market effects of backward integration. These assumptions
also allow us to closely connect the theoretical model to an intuitive graphical presen-
tation. Third,  our analysis  includes  comparative  statics results for changes in plant
capacity,  an important factor in natural resource markets.  Fourth, we  consider both
short- and long-run effects of backward integration in our analysis, where the short run
is defined by fixed plant capacity and a given level of backward integration. In contrast,
Perry (1978b) considers only the long-run equilibrium case.
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The Model: A Graphical Approach
We consider a market with a large number of spatially distributed  competitive input
suppliers  and a downstream spatially concentrated processing industry-a situation
likely  to result in a monopsonized  market solution  where  the local industry  gets  a
spatial monopsony  due to transportation costs. This market structure might occur in
industries where firms possess scale economies over some range of operations and where
transportation costs associated  with assembling the raw input are high. Under these
conditions, processors have an incentive  to be spatially  distributed  so that each pro-
cessing  firm dominates  its local  input  market  area  (Greenhut,  Mai,  and  Norman;
Lofgren). We assume  distant processing firms or mills in various directios from the
dominant mill are fairly numerous, so that each consumes only a small portion of the
locally  supplied input. Bresnahan  and Reiss have  shown competitive  conditions  are
typically achieved  once a market has between three and five  competitors,  suggesting
that  the  dominant  mill  may  reasonably  assume  the  distant  mills  constitute  a
"competitive" fringe of input consumers.  To simplify our analysis, we consider a single
dominant processing firm surrounded by a competitive fringe of processors.
In developing this model, we make a number of other simplifying assumptions. First,
we assume that the number of firms is fixed and processors' output and their raw input
are homogeneous.  Second, we assume that processors  are competitive  in their output
markets.  This  is reasonable  when numerous  firms produce  a  homogeneous  output.
Third, we assume that processing firms produce a single output employing a quasi-fixed
proportions technology that allows no substitution between the raw input and a vector
of other  production  inputs.  This  assumption  allows  us  to  focus  the analysis  on the
interaction of upstream and downstream firms in an input market. Fourth, we assume
the dominant firm enjoys falling average production  costs as output expands toward
optimal capacity utilization, and that as output rises above the optimum,  average cost
rises.  This assumption  is consistent with  a  short- or  intermediate-run  model  of an
industry where capital costs are high and plant capacity is fixed.
The  market  situation  described  above  is  depicted  in figure  1.  On the  left,  total
upstream input supply is defined as x, = x,(wm),  where  wm  is market price.  Acting as
price  takers, fringe processing firms  set their optimal input levels  so that aggregate
fringe input demand is Xd = Xd(wm).  The residual supply facing the dominant processor
is shown on the right as x °  =  x  °(wm)  =  x,(wm)  - Xd(wm).  In the absence of vertical control,
the dominant firm acts as a monopsonist with respect to residual supply, maximizing
profit by setting value marginal product for raw input x, VMPX, equal to marginal outlay
for that input, MOr.  In figure  1, this occurs at quantity xm  and price wm.
From a technical efficiency  point of view, the dominant firm underemploys the raw
input at the monopsony solution defined  in figure  1. Assuming a constant raw input
price, the firm could reduce average cost per unit of output by expanding production.
Assuming output price is fixed, this would raise profit. However, unless the firm is able
to price discriminate among input suppliers, this alternative is not profitable. Without
price discrimination, the dominant firm must pay input suppliers a higher price for all
units purchased to expand output, wiping out cost savings from increased  production.
However,  by partially backward integrating into its input market, the dominant firm
can simultaneously increase profit by expanding input use through internally produced
input supply to partially eliminate the efficiency loss from input underemployment and
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by  continuing to exercise monopsony  market power  in purchases  from unintegrated
input suppliers.
Following Perry (1978b), we define the degree of backward integration as the fraction
of identical raw input suppliers controlled by the dominant processor. The  dominant
firm  can  achieve  backward  integration  either  through  acquiring  a  fraction  of the
upstream  firms in the raw  input industry  or  by  entering into  exclusive  long-term
contracts with input suppliers who control a portion of total supply. For the moment,
assume that integration is achieved through acquisition. Suppose the dominant firm
purchases fraction a of raw input suppliers so that internally it produces amount xc of
the raw input. It  then purchases quantity x,  from the spot market. In this case, the
dominant firm is able to segment its input market, internally supplying raw input at
one transfer price and externally purchasing raw input in the spot market at another
price. On the right-hand side of figure 2, the dominant firm's internal supply (marginal
cost) of raw input is given as xc =  axs(w)), where  wC is the internal transfer price the
dominant firm "pays" its internal input supply subsidiary, and its residual spot market
supply is given as  xrs =  xrs(w) 
= (1 - a)Xs(m) - Xd(Wm).
To  maximize profit, the dominant firm will continue to act as a monopsonist with
respect to its external residual input supply, but now will operate its internal raw input-
producing facilities at the quantity that equates VMPX to the marginal factor cost of the
raw input (MFC) (Perry  1978b), where MFC =  WC  =  x l(xc/a), and xs 1()  is the inverse
supply function obtained by solving the firm's internal supply, xc = ax,(wc), for wC. With
partial integration in the input market, the dominant firm sets total raw input use to
equate its marginal outlay for externally purchased input plus  marginal factor  cost
for internally controlled input (MOrs +  x, in figure  2)  equal to VMPX. To  achieve  this
result, the  dominant firm chooses  the amount of input produced  internally, xc,  and
the price it pays in the spot market,  wm. Total input quantity for the dominant firm is
Xt  = xc + xrs(w). In figure 2, optimal total input use with backward integration is xt,
with quantity xc  purchased in the spot market and quantity x  produced internally.
Equilibrium  spot market price is now  given by w,, and the internally supplied raw
input transfer  price  is  wC. As a result of backward  integration,  total input  use has
expanded from x  m to xt , and the equilibrium spot market input price has fallen from wm
to  Wm.
The dominant firm reaps two potential benefits from partial backward integration
into its input market. First, it benefits from efficiency gains of expanded production. In
figure 2, this gain is measured as area abcd under the dominant firm's input demand
function  for x.  Second,  the dominant firm benefits  (in this particular  example) from
paying a lower spot market price for externally supplied raw input. This gain is given
by area efgh in figure 2. That is, partial backward integration results in a reduction in
the price for external raw input purchases amounting to  wm - w e . This benefit is case
specific and depends,  among other things,  on the slope of the dominant firm's input
demand for x (the slope of VMPX). If, for example,  the dominant firm's input demand
was flatter near the equilibrium input quantity xt , then the equilibrium dominant firm
monopsony  price  wm would be  less than the equilibrium external input price  w  .In
this case, the dominant firm would suffer a loss from having to pay a higher price for
externally supplied input after backward integration.
To obtain these  benefits, the dominant firm must bear additional  costs.  The inte-
grated firm produces  xc  of raw input internally.  Total variable  cost of this production
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is  area  ijk  in figure  2.  However,  the  costs  to  the  dominant firm  of acquiring  this
upstream production  capacity are  not covered.  Acquisition  costs are related to rents
accruing  to input  suppliers  before they are purchased.  There are many possibilities
(such as greenfield investment, joint venture, buyout, long-term contract),  all of which
vary as to risk, capital commitment,  and level of control.
For  simplicity,  we  follow Perry's  (1978b) case  1, and  assume that processors  can
acquire any fraction of upstream firms by paying them the present value of the stream
of per period initial rents,  so that acquired suppliers  are indifferent  between main-
taining independent ownership or being acquired by the dominant processing firm. In
figure 2, this amounts  to paying the acquired  suppliers the equivalent  of area enk at
each time period.  Hence,  per period total cost of internal production is given by area
enijk. This  is the  same  payment that would  be  required  for input  purchases  made
through establishing exclusive  supply contracts when the dominant firm has perfect
information about upstream firms' production costs and when the dominant firm does
not in any way act as a "predator" in forming long-term contracts.  Before acquisition,
the dominant firm incurred external input costs of area enok for input production that
becomes internalized in the vertically integrated firm. Thus, the net increase in input
costs after integration is area nijo. On balance, the total benefit from backward inte-
gration is area abcd plus area efgh minus area nijo.
While we assume that the number of fringe firms is fixed, it is possible to draw some
conclusions about the effects of price changes resulting from vertical integration on the
profitability and behavior of fringe processors.  In the case where backward integration
results in an equilibrium external input price that is lower than the pre-integration
input price, fringe  processing firms' profitability  rises, creating an incentive  for the
fringe to expand operations. Fringe firm expansion will place competitive pressure  on
the dominant firm, and may ultimately result in lost market share for the dominant
firm. Alternatively, when backward integration results in a higher equilibrium external
input price, this creates an unfavorable  economic environment for fringe processors. In
this case, backward integration could be used as a means of raising rivals' costs to allow
the dominant firm to capture a larger market share (Salop and Scheffman).
Mathematical Model
The remainder of this article  provides  a brief formal analysis  of captive  supplies.  As
discussed above, we assume that the dominant firm produces a single output,y, employ-
ing a quasi-fixed production technology that does not allow substitution between input
x and other inputs z and capacity k, but does allow substitution among inputs other
than x. Further, we assume that the dominant firm's plant size k is fixed in the short
run, so that cost is conditional on plant size.
This technology is given by:
(1)  y  = min(x/P, f(z,  k)),
where P represents a constant x-to-y conversion ratio, k is capacity or quantity of capital,
z is a vector of input quantities other than x and k, and f(z, k) is concave with positive
and declining marginal products for capital k and all remaining inputs z (Sexton). Cost
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minimization requires y = x/p = f(z, k). The cost function for this technology is written
as:
(2)  C(y, w, v; k)  = y3w  + c(y, v; k)  + FC,
where w is the price of raw input x, v is a vector of variable input prices associated with
z,  and FC is fixed  costs.  The first term represents raw input costs,  and c(y, v; k) =
min, {v'z: f(z, k)  2 y} represents costs of all remaining inputs other than capital (FC).
Given these assumptions, costs can be reformulated in terms of raw input quantity so
that
(3)  C(y, w, v; k)  = xw  + c(x/, v; k)  + FC.
For now, we set aside  the long-run  problem  of determining the optimal degree  of
backward integration.  Here, we concentrate  on the short-run problem  of determining
the optimal quantity of raw input to produce internally and the optimal price to set in
the unintegrated upstream spot market, given that the dominant firm integrates with
proportion  a of the upstream industry.  To  maximize  short-run vertically  integrated
profit, the  dominant firm must maximize the joint profit  of its processing and raw
input-producing operations. This is achieved by acting as a monopsonist with respect
to its upstream  spot market residual  supply and operating its internal input supply
unit according  to the competitive rule of choosing internal  input production  so that
marginal benefit equals marginal cost. Total variable cost of internal input production
is given by:
(4)  TVCX  = fX  (x/adx,
where x  '(x/a) is the inverse supply function for the fraction of input supply produced
internally,  and xc is the quantity produced  internally.  Fixed  cost for these inputs is
also a function of a, fc(a), since processors must either purchase or negotiate long-term
contracts with existing input suppliers. The dominant firm's output, expressed in terms
of input x, is y =  [(1  - a)x,(wm)  - xd(wm)  +  XC]/  = [Xr(w m) +  X]/P.
Given these definitions, the dominant firm's short-run profit-maximization problem
is specified as:
(5)  max  7  =P[Xrs(Wm) + xc]/  - m[Xrs(Wm)]
Wm,Xc
- [  xS,(x/a)dx  + fc(a)
- C([Xrs(Wm)  +  ]/P,V; k)  - FC.
The first term is revenue from output sales, the second term is externally supplied input
cost, the third term is internally supplied input cost, the fourth term is other input costs
conditional on k, and the fifth term is fixed costs. The dominant firm's short-run profit-
maximizing first-order conditions are:
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(6)  a  p  W-rs  (W m ) = 0
Wm  ^  WmJ[J  - x(w)  0
and
_(7)  p  - c') - X  l(xc/a)  = 0,
axc e 3
where c'(.)  is the derivative  of c(.)  with respect to total raw input quantity x.  Inter-
preting equation (7), the dominant firm sets internal raw input production to equate
VMPx = (p - c'())/P with its internal marginal cost of input production. If vertical inte-
gration is achieved only through long-term contracting, equation (7) gives the dominant
firm's optimal contract quantity, given that it has already contracted with portion a of
upstream firms.
Equation (6) can be expressed in elasticity form as:
(8)  _  P  - '(  Wm  +  = 0.
OWm  P  rs.
Interpreting equation (8), the dominant firm sets raw input price to equate  VMPx with
its marginal outlay for externally purchased input MOrs  wm(l + (1/rs)), where ers is the
price elasticity of residual supply and
£rs  (1  -- {--  - s --  O  x I (1  - Ca)Exs  -Cdxd
Contracting must make input suppliers at least as well off as they would be if they
had not contracted.  Hence, the minimum contract price is
(9)  w  =  W m c  aX(wm)  + fXc  xs  (x/a)dx  /x
where x* is the optimal contract quantity, and wm is the initial equilibrium price in the
external  input market.  It is apparent from equation (9)  that when vertical control is
established through long-term contracts, the equilibrium contract price must be at least
as high as the external spot market price.
It is instructive to contrast the dominant firm-competitive fringe solutions with and
without backward integration. Because a processor executing long-term contracts does
not act as a monopsonist with respect to its contractors, contracting for inputs expands
the dominant processor's use of input x. This can be shown by comparing total input
use under the two equilibria. Total input use with contracting is xt =  xrs(Wm)  +  axs(w)  =
(1 - a)xs(wm)  - xd(wm) +  ax,(w ), and total input use without contractingis  xtm =X(Wm)  -
Xd(Wm).  Subtracting  xm from xt gives  a[x,(wc)  - xs(wm)]  > 0. Assuming positive contract
quantity,  equation  (9)  implies  that contract price  w,  exceeds  spot market price  Wm.
Upward-sloping  supply then  implies  that  xt > xt ,  a result  consistent  with Perry
(1978b).
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A comparison of the external spot market price with and without contracting begins
by solving equation (8) for we :
VMPC
(10)  W  ,x
1  + 1/Crs
where  VMPx is value marginal product evaluated at xtc  and  EC  is the residual supply
curve elasticity  with contracting.  With no contracting,  this relationship  is specified
as:
m  VMPM
(11)  wm -
1  + 1/ers
Combining equations (10)  and (11), the external spot market price under partial con-
tracting can be compared with the spot market price in the case of no contracting:
Wm(  VMPX  1  /r
(12)
w  VMPX m 1  + 1/E
Larger input use implies  VMP c < VMP m because input demand is downward sloping.
Therefore, the ratio of marginal value products in equation (12)  is less than one. If ers
=  es,  then wm/w m will be less than one.  However,  there is no reason to believe  that
mr will equal  ec,  because  Cs depends on the degree of  backward integration and both  eC
and  rc  depend  on  equilibrium  spot  market  supply  and  demand  quantities.  While
contracting expands the dominant firm's use of input x, it is not clear exactly how the
elasticities of residual demand are affected. However, ifx,, Xd, and the elasticities of total
supply and fringe demand are assumed constant, then increased contracting results in
lower values of  1 + (1/ecl). Under this rigid assumption, the price ratio  wm/w m rises with
increased backward integration. Without this assumption, the integrated spot market
price will be less than, equal to,  or greater than the unintegrated spot market price
when the ratio VMP/mVMPx is greater than, equal to, or less than the ratio {(1 + 1/em)/
(1  + 1/Ces)}
Comparative Statics Results
To better understand how changes in the dominant firm's capacity (k) and proportion
of input suppliers with which the dominant firm contracts  (a) affect the equilibrium
contract  quantity  and  spot market price,  we  perform  comparative  statics by totally
differentiating  equations (6) and (7).  In this short-run analysis, both capacity and the
degree of backward integration are taken as given.
One unambiguous result can be obtained from the comparative  statics analysis. An
increase  in the dominant  firm's output production  capacity results  in a rise  in the
equilibrium external spot market input price,
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(13)  S  >  0
(13)  dwm  -=  1  x  l(')  1  0 2c(')  aXrs(Wm)  1
dk  [  H  Ox /a  a  ayak  Wm  p
where  HI  is the determinant of the Hessian matrix H. Since H is a  2 x 2 matrix and
must be negative semidefinite for profits to be maximized,  IHI  must be positive. The
first right-hand-side  (RHS) term in expression (13)  is negative. The second RHS term
is positive since input supply is upward sloping. The third RHS term is positive. The
fourth term,  O 2c(.)/ldyk, is negative because marginal cost falls as output capacity rises.
The fifth term is positive since residual input supply is increasing in price. The last RHS
term,  1/P,  is also positive.
The effect of an increase in the dominant firm's output capacity on the equilibrium
internal supply is ambiguous:
(14)  dx c =  1  P[[  -c'(  )  1  < w  r
dk  |H ]  p  dw 2  awm  J  ayak  = O.
The term (p - c'(.))//  - wm is nonnegative.  It is positive when the dominant firm is able
to exert monopsony market power in the raw input spot market. The term 32xrs(wm)/Ow2
depends on the second derivatives of input supply and fringe processor input demand,
and cannot be signed. Under certain conditions, however, expression (14) can be signed.
If the  dominant  firm's  residual  supply  is  perfectly  elastic,  then  it  cannot  exert
monopsony market power, and  (p - c'(-))/P  - wm =  0. In this case, dx,/dk > 0, so that an
increase in the dominant firm's output capacity  will expand its equilibrium internal
input supply. The same comparative  static result occurs when input supply xs(wm) and
fringe demand xd(wm) are linear,  so that their second derivatives  and that of residual
supply are  zero. Furthermore,  if the dominant firm's residual  supply increases  at a
decreasing rate, then dxc/dk > 0.
The effect  of a change in the proportion of input supply firms which the dominant
processing firm contracts with or purchases  from (a) on the equilibrium external spot
market input price (Wi)  is ambiguous:
(15)  dwm  1  [x:l(')  1  + a2c()  1
da  IHI [aC/  a  a  ay2 p2
p-(  -c)  Wm  x  + Xs(Wm)
X(Wm)  - Xc/l a2C()  dX;(-)  1  CXs(Wm)  1<  < +  S~  O  S  _  rs  O.
IHI  ay2 9xc/Ia  a  W  P2 >
Since xs(wm) - x,/a =  x,(w m) - x,(Wc),  and wc > Wm,  it  follows  that x,(wm)  - xc/a < 0, and
the second line in expression (15) is negative. So if
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then dwmlda < 0, and increases in the proportion of input supply firms with which the
dominant processing firm contracts will reduce the equilibrium  external spot market
input price.  This  condition  is more likely when the  dominant firm's  residual  input
supply rises linearly or at a decreasing  rate and the firm is able to exert monopsony
market power in the external spot market.
The  effect of an increase in the proportion of input suppliers contracting with the
dominant processor on contracted supply is also ambiguous:
)  dxc  _  -1  a
2c(.)  OXr(Wm)  1  (p-c'()  )  X(WM) (16)  +  Xs(W ( m)
da  -- n--  _  (  - -^---
[  x,/  a2  ay2 P 2
+  1  a2c()  x()  x,  xs(Wm) I  <
IHI  y2 ax/a  a2  aWm  p2





then dxC/da > 0. The first expression is more likely to hold when the dominant firm's
residual input supply is upward sloping and it is able to exert monopsony market power
in the input spot market. The second inequality holds when the dominant firm's residual
input supply is linear or increasing at a decreasing rate.
In sum, an increase in the dominant firm's output production capacity will raise the
external spot market price for raw input. The other three comparative statics results
depend on the dominant firm's ability to exert monopsony  power and  on the second
derivative  of its residual input supply.  If residual  supply is linear or increasing at a
declining rate, then a rise in output capacity will increase internal contract quantity or
raw input. If
x(wm)  < I-[(P - c'())/P  -wm]axs(Wm)/laml,
then a rise in the proportion of input suppliers under contract to the dominant firm
will  decrease the equilibrium  external spot market  price. If both of these conditions
hold,  then the  equilibrium  internally  produced  raw input  quantity increases  with
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In the  above  short-run  model,  the  proportion  of vertically  integrated  suppliers  is
exogenous. In the long run, a is a choice variable, set to maximize profits. Applying the
envelope theorem and using the definition Xrs  =  (1  - a)xs(Wm) - Xd(Wm),  the optimal choice
for a solves:
(17)  A = -[P  (  - w 7Jxs(wm)  - 1  (fc  x,
1 (x/a)dx -fc'()  = O, aa  P  9a  Lo
which can be rewritten as
(18)  a  [p,  W  Xs(Wm)
+ (x */a)Xl  (X  c/a)
-f  x, 1(x/a)(l/a)dx - fc'(') = 0.
Jo
Multiplying the RHS of equation (18) by a and rearranging then results in:
(19)  P c  )  - W  cx (wx) =  X X8 (x, /a)
f  xl(x/a) dx  - afc'(').
The left-hand  side of equation (19)  is VMPX  less external spot market price, or profit
from the dominant  firm's use of a unit of raw input purchased  in the external  spot
market  times  the  contract input  supply function  evaluated at the equilibrium  spot
market price.  This term represents the economic rent achieved by purchasing input in
the spot market that the dominant firm could have produced internally. The first term
on the RHS of equation (19) is the value to the  hfirm of internally produced input, the
second term is the negative of total variable cost of producing internal input, and the
third term is the negative of incremental fixed costs incurred by contracting. Hence, the
right-hand  side  gives  the  dominant  firm's  producer  surplus  from  producing  input
internally net of incremental  fixed  costs associated with producing additional input
internally. The firm chooses optimal a to equate the profit from external supply, gained
through exertion of monopsony market power, with the profit, or increase in producer
surplus net of contracting  or acquisition costs from internally producing raw input.
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Under the model assumption that integrated  input suppliers (those under contract
or purchased by the dominant firm) are paid the present value  of the stream of per
period initial rents,  the dominant processing firm will not fully backward integrate
so long as its residual spot market input supply is upward sloping and its VMPX curve
is downward  sloping.  A  fully integrated  dominant firm utilizes  internally  supplied
input to equate internal VMPX with internal marginal factor cost. However,  if residual
supply is upward sloping, by reducing a the firm can make a positive profit by acting as
a monopsonist with respect to its residual supply.  Hence, the dominant firm will not
fully backward integrate into its input market as long as the monopsony profits to be
made  from external  input  purchases  are  larger than the lost efficiency  gains from
internal production less the cost of purchasing the capacity required to achieve those
gains.
At the other  extreme, the dominant firm will backward integrate  until increased
output production efficiency gains plus increased profits from monopsony power exertion
equal the cost of obtaining increased internal input production capacity. The firm will
backward integrate until the economic rents from purchasing input in the spot market
which  could  have been  produced internally equate  with the producer  surplus from
internal input production net of incremental capacity costs.
Conclusions
In this analysis,  we  demonstrate  both  graphically  and analytically  some  important
implications of a dominant processing firm's backward integration into its input supply
industry. Contrary to the competitive view that vertical integration does not have effects
external to the integrated  firm, we find that backward  integration has a number of
important market effects. First, with backward integration, a dominant firm potentially
can benefit from efficiency gains of expanded output and from a price reduction for its
externally purchased inputs. Second, with partial backward integration, total input use
by the dominant firm rises. These results  are consistent with those of Perry (1978b).
Third, when the dominant firm partially integrates through long-term contracting, its
contract price will be at least as high as the equilibrium external spot market price for
inputs. Fourth, when the dominant firm backward integrates, the price that it pays for
externally purchased inputs can be higher, lower, or equal to the price it  would have
paid had it not integrated, depending on the effects that integration has on its elasticity
of input demand and on its residual supply elasticity.
A comparative statics analysis reveals  several important implications of backward
integration. An increase in output capacity raises both the equilibrium external spot
market raw input price and the dominant firm's optimal internal raw input production.
A rise in the proportion of input supply firms with which the dominant firm contracts
results in a fall in the equilibrium external spot market price for raw input and a rise
in the dominant firm's optimal internal raw input production.
Last, we investigate the dominant firm's backward-integration  choice. We find that
the optimal  degree  of integration  results  when benefits  from residual spot  market
supply management to reduce the price of externally purchased raw input equals the
dominant firm's net profit from internal production  of raw input. We also find that
backward integration will be partial so long as acquired input suppliers are paid the
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present value of the stream of initial economic rents, residual supply is upward sloping,
and the dominant firm's input demand is downward sloping.
Many  of  the  results  of this  model  are  consistent  with  empirical  relationships
uncovered in the recent PSA studies of the red meat packing industry.  For example,
Williams et al. and Ward et al. found (a) that beef processors paid higher prices  for
cattle procured  through marketing agreements than for cattle purchased  in the spot
market, (b) that higher rates of capacity utilization are associated with increased use
of captive  supplies, (c) that plants with larger capacities  make greater use of captive
supplies, and (d) that larger plants paid more for fed cattle than smaller plants. Under
a wide range of circumstances,  each of these results is predicted by our analysis.
Evidence from both Ward et al. and Williams et al. suggests that the price paid for
cattle procured through forward contracting is lower than spot market price. This seems
at variance  with our results.  However,  it may be that forward-contracted  purchases
should not be included in captive supplies. Captive supplies might be better defined as
those inputs with production processes vertically integrated into the firm, which means
that the firm has "ownership and complete control over neighboring stages of production
or distribution" (Perry 1989, p. 186). Forward contracting provides risk sharing, but the
firm does not have complete control over production decisions for these inputs. Sellers
may be willing to accept a lower price to have some of the production risk assumed by
the purchasing firm.
In the  same  PSA  study,  Ward  et al.  estimate  that a  1% increase  in  a packer's
inventory of cattle purchased through marketing agreements results in a 10-41t per
cwt price decline in the cash market for fed cattle that day (p. 25). The evidence with
respect to packer-fed  cattle is  mixed. Ward et al. report a  1%  increase  in a packer's
inventory of packer-fed cattle is associated with changes in cash market prices vary-
ing from a 300 per cwt decline for a 14-day inventory increase to a 20¢ per cwt rise for
a 28-day inventory increase (p. 25). Again, these empirical results are predicted by our
model.
Our results illustrate that a dominant firm's backward integration into input markets
can have important  effects  on  market participants  external to the  integrated  firm.
Importantly, we show that captive supplies may be used as a potential source for market
power  exertion.  While many  of the results  of our study  are  consistent  with recent
findings  in the PSA  meat  packing industry  studies,  the applicability  of our model
extends to other agricultural  sectors, like poultry, and to natural resource industries,
like forest products, where large processing firms are partially backward integrated into
their strategic input markets.
An important caveat to these results is that the depressing effects of backward inte-
gration by the dominant firm on spot market price may not be the strategic end of that
integration, but rather one of many purposes of the firm or even a side effect of major
objectives. The dominant firm may value input quality control, input delivery control,
and/or risk reduction just as  highly,  and  may vertically  integrate  to achieve  these
objectives.  Regardless of the intent, a dominant firm's backward integration will likely
have effects external to the firm.
[Received October 1997; final revision received October 1998.]
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